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This report is based on an original document prepared by Kirit Parikh as part of a larger 
study on the Influence of Research on Public Policy, conducted by IDRC’s Evaluation Unit. 
I am grateful to Diana Tussie for her very helpful comments. 
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Policy Influence has long been a target of Canada’s International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) programming.  In order to better understand what “policy influence” and 
“policy impact” is, the Centre’s Evaluation Unit has undertaken a study to review the role 
that research has in the policy making process.  More specifically, the study looks at three 
questions: (1) What constitutes policy influence in IDRC’s experience; (2) To what degree, 
and in what ways, has IDRC-supported research influenced public policy; and (3) What 
factors and conditions have facilitated or inhibited the public policy influence potential.  By 
reviewing a series of 25 projects that have received the Centre’s support over the last 
decade, patterns and key issues are expected to be drawn.   
 
This initiative includes three studies that look at the Micro Impacts of Macroeconomic and 
Adjustment Policies (MIMAP) Program.   This support was granted by IDRC to help 
developing countries build a knowledge base to measure and analyse poverty, and design 
programs and policies to meet economic stabilization targets while alleviating poverty and 
reducing vulnerability.  One of the newest members of the MIMAP network, Senegal is 
particular in that much of its efforts have been directed toward the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) and as such the team has been working closely with the relevant 
National Ministries.  
 
Drawing on a number of documents that fed into a previous draft, this report contemplates 
the Centre’s internal documents, the Project Approval Document, and external documents 
such as project reports to its other Canadian donor, the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA).1  Interviews with key players were conducted in Senegal by 
Fred Carden of the Evaluation Unit, and transcribed for use herein.   
 
This study attempts to unravel the role that the MIMAP research has in the decision-
making process and in national policy influence.  The introduction briefly reviews the 
broader MIMAP framework and what its objectives are.  It also presents a snapshot of the 
national political, economical and social context that brought the MIMAP program to 
Senegal, and what the project has involved in the last two years. 
 
Subsequent sections address policy influence more specifically.  An outline of the policy 
process for poverty initiatives before the program began is compared  with a new reality 
stemming from MIMAP’s involvement the PRSP process.  Considering its short run, this is 
particularly encouraging as it has significantly altered the decision making process to 
involve collaborative effort between researcher and policy makers. 
 
Following is a section on the various types of policy influence according to who is 
influenced, in what way, and the final implications on programs and policies.  This section 
reviews how research can expand capacity building, broaden policy horizons, and change 
policy regimes.  Supporting examples from the project are included. 
 
The various types of policy influence are affected both positively and negatively by a series 
of internal and external factors.  Addressing each in turn, the section concludes with a 
table summarizing eight factors: key individuals, technical capacities, perception, 
dissemination, timing, communications, institutional issues and national hurdles. 
 
                                                
1 A previous draft of this work was commissioned to Kirit Parikh, 2002.  
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THE MIMAP SENEGAL PROGRAM 
 
The Broader MIMAP Initiative 
 
The Micro Impacts of Macroeconomic and Adjustment Policies (MIMAP) program came 
about in response to the difficulties many developing countries were having in meeting 
structural adjustment targets and maintaining sustained growth. National measures 
included reduced public spending, devalued currencies, and liberalized trade and financial 
sectors.  These macroeconomic changes had drastic and unintended effects on the poor 
and vulnerable, further brought to light by publications of various international bodies such 
as the United Nations Children’s Fund, the World Bank and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.  While tools were developed for measuring and monitoring 
poverty and for modeling national economics, their use suffered from the limited 
involvement of national actors.  
 
In 1990 IDRC launched the MIMAP program in the Philippines with the aim of developing a 
local knowledge base and capacities that could sustain efforts to measure poverty and 
analyse the impacts of macroeconomic policies and shocks.  Bangladesh, the other 
MIMAP initiative reviewed in IDRC’s larger study, started in 1992.  The program spread to 
include six other Asian countries, and subsequently, five countries in Africa.2
 
 
Senegal in Context 
 
Independent from France in 1960, Senegal later joined with the Gambia to form the 
nominal confederation of Senegambia in 1982. However, the envisaged integration of the 
two countries was never carried out, and the union was dissolved in 1989. After 40 years 
of independence under a single administration, Abdoulaye Wade was elected president by 
popular vote for a five-year term and a new constitution was adopted in January 2001. 
Senegal is now a republic under multiparty democratic rule. 
 
Since the 1980s, Senegal’s economy has been confronted with a series of structural 
problems manifested in low economic growth, strong internal demand and chronic deficit in 
balance of payments, and instability in public finances.  A certain macroeconomic stability 
was achieved through a number of macro-adjustments in the 1980s and 90s,  however 
one continues to see serious deterioration in the quality of life of many Senegalese 
households. 
 
In 1991/92, the Social Dimensions of Adjustments program estimated 33% of the 
population was living below the poverty level.3  A 2001 estimate indicated nearly 2/3 of the 
country’s inhabitants are now considered poor with 54% of its population living below the 
poverty line. Senegal is classified as among the 20 poorest countries in the world.4   
 
                                                
2 MIMAP support has been provided to the Philippines, Bangladesh, India, Vietnam, Nepal, 
Laos, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Benin, Morocco, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Ghana. (IDRC 
brochure) 
3 IDRC Project Approval Document for MIMAP Senegal. p.2.1999. 
4 Parikh 2002. 
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In January 1994, Senegal undertook a bold and ambitious economic reform program with 
the support of the international donor community. This reform began with the currency, the 
CFA franc (previously linked at a fixed rate to the French franc) being devalued by 50%.  
Government price controls and subsidies were dismantled. After seeing its economy 
contract by 2.1% in 1993, Senegal made an important turnaround with the reform program, 
obtaining real growth in its gross domestic product (GDP) averaging 5% annually during 
1995-2001. Annual inflation had been pushed down to less than 1%, but rose to an 
estimated 3.3% in 2001. Investment rose steadily from 13.8% of GDP in 1993 to 16.5% in 
1997.  
 
As is the case in many African countries, the number of poor people continue to rise even 
though increases in GDP have been detected.  Data on poverty in Senegal indicates an 
important rural context with more than 80% of the poor living in rural areas. Agriculture and 
industrial development have been relatively stagnant, credit schemes have been limited 
and the role of the private sector has not expanded as envisioned following the 




MIMAP in Senegal 
 
.  IDRC had been involved in institution building in West Africa since the 1980’s, and one 
of the institutions supported was the Centre de Recherche en Économie Appliqué (CREA) 
when it was quite weak and largely inactive.  Abdoulaye Diagne, CREA’s director, 
advocated for a research arm within the University’s Economics Department, and secured 
IDRC support to rebuild CREA. In the latter 1990’s, CREA started to work with the Ministry 
of Education but without IDRC support, CREA probably wouldn’t have continued this work 
with them as payments took too long and they would have had to halt work long before its 
completion date.5  
 
Co-financing for MIMAP had been confirmed with the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) a few months before IDRC’s formal approval, and the project was 
accelerated at the request of CIDA who had been involved throughout the discussions. 
MIMAP Senegal started in June 2000 with the general objective of improving research on 
issues of macroeconomics and poverty analysis.  More specifically, it aimed to:  
(1) construct a profile of the poverty in Senegal and develop a monitoring system;  
(2) develop tools to analyse the impact of macroeconomic policies on income distribution;  
(3) specifically study: poor people’s access to financial services, the gender dimension of 
poverty, and the relation between education and poverty.  
(4) encourage dialogue among development actors working in the fight against poverty 
(researchers, policy makers, NGOs and financiers). 
 
The research team was comprised of 10 professors and doctoral students from CREA as 
well as from the Office of Statistics.  It benefits from two advisory committees, one 
designed to manage administrative questions, and the other to approve the research 
program and assure its visibility and availability for use by decision makers. The latter 
incorporates representative of different Ministries and national and international 
organizations. 
 
                                                
5 Diagne 2002. 
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The following figures illustrates the framework originally proposed and introduces the 
project’s different axes.  
 
Figure 1: Program Outline 















Literature Review and construction of a unified 









Income Distribution Measurement 
 
 
Monitoring System to follow the causes of 




The entire MIMAP Team 
 
Sidy Gueye (DPS) 
















































































The Gender Dimensions of Poverty in Senegal 
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MIMAP started quietly with the project. Just a few months into the project, Diagne, the 
MIMAP project leader, was made aware of the country’s requirement to produce a 
comprehensive Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper or PRSP.  This requirement was being 
contemplated at about the same time that IDRC expanded the MIMAP network to include 
Senegal.   
 
Senegal was eligible for a new program led by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund to alleviate debt, and benefit from new loans.  However, to be eligible, 
these Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) were each required to submit a proposal on 
how the various national actors intended to use newly available funds to reduce poverty.  
In line with other countries, Senegal established poverty reduction programs and in 1997, 
presented a strategy for poverty reduction based on 4 main objectives: (1) revenue 
generation and employment increase through micro enterprise; (2) improved access to 
basic social services; (3) promotion of women in economic development; and (4) capacity 
building in rural communities and improved monitoring of household status. 
 
A number of factors seem to have been involved with the joining of these two initiatives, 
that is, MIMAP and the PRSP.  For example the project team included policy makers that 
would be involved with the PRSP process.  There is also important reference to a project 
monitor Gerard Gagnon who saw the CREA/MIMAP work complementary to the PRSP 
needs, brought it to the attention of policy makers, and acted as a catalyst  to initiate 
collaboration between the Statistics Office, CIDA, IDRC and the project director (who was 
also the director of CREA).  Eventually, various stakeholders were brought into the PRSP 
project. CREA played a critical research role in the process.6   
 
A very timely poverty analysis workshop took place in November 2000 at which 7 
members of the CREA team attended, and with this CREA’s work in the PRSP began.7 To 
a large extent, the originally planned MIMAP activities were put on the back burner – the 
donor officers supported the PRSP work and were flexible in accommodating this need.   
 
The bottom line is that the PRSP process made active use of CREA data and studies – a 
contribution which was praised on a number of counts.  The PRSP recommendations are 
based on CREA findings, illustrating the importance of the work in influencing policy, 
particularly in Senegal’s poverty reduction strategy.8 CREA’s help made the PRSP 
document written by Senegalese and not foreigners, establishing ownership which is 
expected to make implementation easier. 
 
To date, the main policy impact of MIMAP in Senegal is due to its involvement with the 
PRSP. Before moving on to more specific attention to aspects of policy influence, there are 
two further points that should be made.  The first is the apparent interchangeablity 
between CREA and MIMAP which to a certain extent complicates causality.  Second, and 
related to the first, is that IDRC support to CREA started some years earlier and has 
contributed significantly to the direct and indirect impact of MIMAP and other work with 
national bodies.  CREA has played an important role in the design the new education 
policy in Senegal. Part of the support to this process has been funded by other donors but 
work on education and poverty as part of the MIMAP project has played a significant role 
                                                
6 The PRSP was expected to reflect a consensus among government bodies, local 
experts, development partners and civil society organizations. 
7 Comments of Luc Savard on Parikh, 2002. 
8 Ailou Faye and Racine Kane, 2002. Also Amadou Dia, 2002. 
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in helping design the policy. Also, CREA was asked to do an impact analysis of 
liberalization of the groundnut sector in Senegal in collaboration with IDRC by using the 
CGE model built by the team. There is also on-going discussion for the team to help the 
Ministry of Agriculture design the reform of the groundnut sector.   
 
 
POLICY PROCESS AND COMMUNITY 
 
From the start, the project was intended to support the government in its national initiatives 
in the fight against poverty.  Translated from its French version, IDRC’s second report to 
co-financer the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) states “these 
research works would feed into decision making”.  However, while reports indicate this 
objective, interviews revealed that policy influence was not explicitly discussed within the 
groups. 
 
In order to better understand the relationship between research and decision making, 
Pross introduced the concept of policy communities to identify the various actors or groups 
that may exert influence in policy making.9   To the  extent that CREAs collaboration with 
the various Ministries was coincidental (others did not view it as accidental at all), what is 
important to note here is that the policy community changed.  Before the PRSP, national 
researchers were largely ignored by policy makers and economic policy research was 
directed primarily by staff of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.10  As 
illustrated in figure 2, the involvement of national researchers in the PRSP is a critical case 







                                                
9 See Lindquist, Evert., Discerning Policy Influence: Frameworks for a Strategic Evaluation 
of IDRC Supported Research.  University of Victoria. September 2001. p.6. 
10 In addition to coming up in various interviews, the program objections have a similar 
connotation indicating that the project aim to build national analytical capacities on 
questions that were generally handled by foreign economists from the WB and the IMF. 
IDRC 2002 p. 1. 
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Figure 2: Changes in the Policy Community 
Senegalese Policy Community BEFORE PRSP Senegalese Policy Community AFTER PRSP 
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Whereas national bodies rarely consulted research before, except for the occasional 
consultancy, several of the MIMAP researchers were also public administrators therefore 
resulting in a policy process that was much more interactive.  Not only did the 
administration make their needs known, they were also informed by researchers as to 
what was needed.  Consultation does not end after policy decisions have been made, 
rather researchers are involved in monitoring and evaluation processes as well. 
 
In an interview, Faye and Kane outlined three levels at which policy influence happens: 
1. building the skills and capacities of policy makers 
2. influencing those who will influence policy makers 
3. influencing policy makers directly. 
 
Concepts of longer term influence can be considered a form of enlightenment, and more 
immediate results may be associated with a linear perception of policy processes.  This 
project evidences both.  The influence can be seen as linear in that the research was 
plugged directly into the PRSP process, and enlightening in that other research was 
perhaps not used immediately but was expected to provide fresh perspective which is 
likely to influence policy at a latter stage.11
 
This project has some clean policy implications at the national level as well as at the 
international level.  Most notably of course is the PSRP paper resulting from the 
collaborative process among government bodies and CREA many of whom were MIMAP 
researchers. Perhaps the most striking aspect of this policy influence is the fact that it was 
unintended.  While the final result was likely more than the project hoped to achieve, there 
was a sense of apology that the MIMAP team was not able to keep the original calendar of 





                                                
11 Tall, 2002. 
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TYPES OF POLICY INFLUENCE 
 
While the previous section discusses how research influences policy, this section 
discusses the forms that such influence takes.  This is based on Lindquist’s typology that 
presents three principle classifications.  Each of these, expanding policy capacities, 
broadening policy horizons, and affecting policy regimes are addressed in turn. 
 
Expanding Policy Capacities 
 
The MIMAP project has resulted in improved data and knowledge of the various actors.  
Capacity was a key element of the proposal, and the various MIMAP activities and training 
events illustrate efforts towards this.  Particular examples include the development of the 
CGE model and the work that forced a review of the available poverty data.  The latter 
resulted in new and more relevant data on poverty in Senegal: Gueye, a practitioner within 
the Ministry of Education, noted that because of CREA’s requests for information, some of 
the government departments improved their information collection methods in order to 
provide what was needed.12
 
CREA’s help was noted to effectively delineated the links between macro-economics and 
poverty alleviation.13  While the government was aware that the link between economic 
growth and poverty reduction existed, the research provided more specific indications of 
particular sectors needed to be acted on.  Similarly, the research informed the 
Microfinance Department within the Ministry of Finance and the Economy on adjustments 
to improve the viability of financial mechanisms and structures. It is also expected to 
provide information on the impact of their policies in regards to poverty alleviation. 
 
Visibility and trust grew with the research, and the team became known for their abilities, 
establishing CREA as a credible research centre for government work. The researchers 
trained within the framework of the MIMAP project are now considered as being among 
the most qualified resource persons in the region. 
 
 
Broadening Policy Horizons 
 
Many people have benefited from CREA MIMAP in that they have a broader appreciation 
of the agenda and its processes. These include students, researchers, donors, economic 
planners and administrators.  The meetings under the auspices of “Reflection Day on the 
Senegalese Economy” were fingered by several particularly useful opportunities for 
sharing perspectives which made policy makers stop and think.  The fresh perspectives 
provided from the researchers improved work through the introduction of new ideas.  
 
When one of the researchers left the group, he set up a program to link these various 
poverty alleviation initiatives with links research with decision making. This was assisted 
by his close contacts with the research community gained largely through his previous 
work.  Similarly, a member of the Steering Committee left his position, yet continues to 
apply the experience in another initiative in the fight against poverty. 
                                                
12 Gueye, 2002. 
13 Niane commented that the project was able to work on the levers that work in Senegal: 
specifically trying to understand which ones do work in order to better identify the links 




Affecting Policy Regimes 
 
Lindquist categorizes influence that results in fundamental redesign or modification of 
programs as affecting policy regimes.  Two years is a very short period of time in which 
this type of policy influence may be expected, yet this project is an excellent example. 
Linking MIMAP with the PRSP process provided a key opportunity for incorporating 
research into decision making.  CREA/MIMAP were involved throughout the process, but 
particularly in regards to the data collection and poverty diagnostic. Their work is cited in 
the final version available from the website.14  
 
While the PRSP is the most relevant example of research modifying a particular policy, a 
brief note to policy processes is useful here as well. Though addressed in greater detail in 
the dedicated section above, this project was key in re-defining the research policy 
linkages, and work on the PSRP has been a catalyst to improved teamwork and 
coordination between the various stakeholders.  Before the project, the Senegalese 
administration did not have the habit of integrating researchers, except for the occasional 
consultancy.  Collaborative efforts here resulted in recognition that researchers increase 
the quality and speed of the work and of the team. This in itself translates into a new 
framework for collaboration.  Indication that this is being taken seriously is in Diagne’s 
comment that the Ministry wants to alter terms of some of their research areas to meet 
changing needs.  
 
Serving as an example of this collaborative framework, the team was consulted for a 
critical analysis for the Statistics Office in discussions with the World Bank regarding the 
selection of a macro-economic model.15  While other requests have also been forthcoming, 
the CREA/MIMAP staff is overstretched to help in other areas too. 
 
 
FACTORS AFFECTING POLICY INFLUENCE 
 
Various factors were presented in the work of the program that have had or may have 





The role of key individuals is critical in the success of projects.  The CREA/MIMAP leader 
was well respected and therefore trusted and heard. Real Lavergne considered Diagne a 
gem.  Though his potential was perhaps not fully recognized in previous work together, 
Lavergne felt Diagne did a great job and really made something of CREA. 
 
The project leader is not the only key figure in paving the MIMAPs claim to fame.  The 
IDRC project officer permitted significant leeway in this project even though the PRSP took 
over or transformed many of the planned activities. This programming flexibility traces 
                                                
14 The official PRSP can be downloaded from the Senegalese Ministry of Finance and 
Economy (www.finances.gouv.sn). Citations on pgs 17, 23, 24. 
15 IDRC 2002. pg 4. 
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back to a previous IDRC grant that permitted CREA to continue working with the 
government.  
 
One further example is a person that was perhaps less key in light of the MIMAP project 
itself, but quite so in terms of the PRSP and perhaps affected MIMAP’s involvement.  This 
is the Director of Statistics whom the then Minister of Finance saw as the most competent 





In Africa, human capacity is over-extended.  The fact that the PRSP was compiled 
nationally resulted in greater ownership and ease in implementation.  However, national 
experts are too few in number creating a bottleneck in the supply and demand chain.  The 
shortage is exasperated in that these experts are enticed into multilateral agencies or the 
like, causing other problems related with high staff turnover rates.16  In the case of MIMAP 
experience, staff heading elsewhere caused disruption and put the schedule off as new 
members were being brought in and up to date.  This not only affects the quality of the 
work, but also presents problems for institution building. 
 
Also raised were similar issues of long term capacity building versus short term solutions 
in the form of quick research results indicating that quick research results will not solve 
longer term needs for capacity building.  Examples of this included short term consulting 
positions offered by the various lending institutions wherein assignments with a short term 
focus can drain human capital in that the quality of the researcher’s parallel work suffers 
due to the time spent on consulting. 
 
In any case, capacity and perceived capacity certainly offer potential in the policy arena.  
As is the case with key people, as indicated above, CREA was selected to work with the 
PRSP because it was seen as a competent economic research centre.17 Evidence-based 





Individual or collective perceptions held about people or processes are seen to potentially 
affect policy influence.  In regards to individual perceptions, researchers are considered to 
“often have their heads in the clouds” and that as a group they are seen as a “closed 
club”.18 Perhaps a more modern stance, certainly with more potential to enhance 
influence,  was taken up by Tall who sees herself as a researcher as well as a bureaucrat. 
She participates in data analysis, and recognizing the value of the research work.  
 
Collective perceptions of one community or another have probably fed into individual 
perceptions.  The positive perceptions of the international community towards the 
document was illustrated in Senegal being selected for a 4-country video-conference 
sponsored by the World Bank that reviewed strategies and approaches to poverty 
                                                
16 Staff turnover issues may also be attributed to the instability and frequent changes in the 
national machinery. 
17 Dia 2002. Other sources including Sall indicate that CREA had little competition. 
18 Respective quotes attributed to Niane 2002, and Sada Sall 2002. 
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reduction and hoped to learn from what was going on in each of the countries.19   Having 
produced one of the best PRSP document in Africa coupled with the positive reception of 
the international community, resulted in a very strong sense of pride and ownership.  
 
Faye and Kane noted that simply working with the PSRP is important for policy influence, 
because of its importance throughout Africa. This arouses questions of policy influence 
such as how being involved in such an important document will affect those on the team. 
Though CREA was not visible in society at the onset, it was definitely more so after this 





Dissemination of research has been less critical in this case than in some other research 
programs such as the G-24 Technical Support. Apparently, this is because it doesn’t need 
to rope in the decision makers or even appeal to other academics and slowly work into the 
policy core with a minority view.  Certainly research needed to be of high quality and 
relevant, but its dissemination was more important for building a reputation and 
establishing credibility than in decision making per se.20 Persistence and publication over 
time creates reputation for quality, credibility, and capacity that in turn lends to greater 
possibility for policy influence. In fact, it seems that the groups didn’t really address policy 
influence or political issues, but focused mostly on the research itself.21  Being in the right 
place at the right time with a credible reputation meant that dissemination was less critical.  
 
Being interactive, this research had direct access to the policy circles, yet format issues 
are still important and easily digestible work are favoured over long theoretic work.  CREA 
set up the “Day of Reflection on the Economy of Senegal” which was very well received 
and its format was influential in reaching policy makers. Faye and Kane specifically 
indicated that Ministers need short provocative memos to keep the issue in their minds, 
but the back up documentation is needed by their staff for backup.   
 
Though there is not a massive dissemination of CREA findings, students researchers, 
donors, economic planners and administrators all benefit.  Specifically, the ministry of 
finance, and notably the social planning group, the Development Strategies Division as 
using the research. Though CREA was not really visible in society, it was visible where it 





Timing has been a factor that has enhanced the project’s influence in the policy arena in 
that this project presented itself as a window of opportunity.  Some researchers at the 
university had been studying devaluation even though it was considered an impossibility, 
so when it actually happened, there was no capacity in government to understand it or 
comment on it and everyone including the President went to the researchers for 
information.22  
                                                
19 CREA was the focal point for this 2000 event. Dia 2002. 
20 Faye and Kane. 2002. 
21 Sylla. 2002. 
22 Sall, 2002. 
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Collaborative efforts normally take more time, but as there had not been a census since 
1988 and no poverty survey since 1970,  help was needed urgently if the PRSP was going 
to be based on real data.  Needs were discussed and researchers responded.  
 
However time can also work against policy influence. Capacity creation and institution 
building also takes time. Expecting quick result from the process can be 
counterproductive. Training less inexperienced people can be effective, but they need to 
graduate from being research assistants to coauthors and colleagues of the experienced 
supervisors. This is unlikely to happen when the projects are done under pressure for 
quick results.  
 
Similarly, there is a need to spend more time on operationalization of the models (such as 
the general equilibrium model) once they are developed. They are fine to have but they 
need to be used.  It should be noted that while involvement in PRSP related activities 
pushed back the calendar of the originally planned activities, they continue to work on 
originally planned activities which Diagne indicates have increased by 50%.   
 
   
Communications 
 
While the section on dissemination addresses communicating research results, this 
section looks at how interpersonal communication (or lack of it) can affect policy influence.  
The relationships among key people are crucial, as is seen with the CIDA officer who 
suggested linking CREA into the PRSP process.  
 
Many of the program stakeholders discussed the importance of communication, and many 
indicated the lack of it. Researchers with their academic focus have a hard time 
understanding decision makers and constraints of reality.  They still run the danger of 
staying theoretical.  Guèye commented that researchers need to take more time to explain 
themselves to the practitioners so that the latter understand research and how it can help 
them.  Similarly, practitioners need to better understand how to use consultants and 
researchers to facilitate processes of decision.23  There are exceptions such as Diagne, 
but they are still few in number.   
 
While the success of the PRSP lends to a belief of cooperation among researchers and 
policy makers, there is perhaps less evidence of this than cooperation among key, credible 
people.  However, working on the PRSP has instigated movement on both sides, closing 
the gap between research and policy makers. The CREA team responded favourably to 
the interest expressed by the DPS, and shared information well.   
 
It is interesting that focus on communication issues often seemed to market ideas of an 
institutional framework which would put MIMAP in direct contact, and formally link the work 
with the Bureau of Statistics.   
 
 
                                                
23 In his notes, Carden indicates that several interviewees commented they know the value 
of research in decision-making processes, but that their colleagues do not. See interview 




Focus on institution building has surfaced as a means to enhance policy influence.  In the 
first instance it is useful to review IDRC’s role in CREA’s development. Institution building 
was not an IDRC policy, however Lavergne felt that support through CREA could 
eventually offer significant impact in the region, regardless of its high costs. The 
CREA/MIMAP experience has addressed both issues simultaneously. Though building 
research centres takes time, the investment is paying off, evident from when IDRC 
financing permitted CREA staff to work on government projects when government 
payments came after months of delay.  
 
Similar reference to institutional issues surface in regards to CREA’s position and it having 
more formal links to the Government. Camara comments that If CREA were institutionally 
linked, data would be more easily accessible.  To date, the links are informal and personal 
with researchers from the bureau involved in MIMAP activities as experts, but not as 
Ministry representatives.  Diagne also noted he is working on establishing some 
institutional frameworks to sustain partnerships.  An example of this may be a 3 year 
contract with the Ministry of Education in which they have been commissioned to do a 
number of studies and prepare an annual report.  The framework would mean the group 
participates in Ministry meetings on related topics. Similarly, now that the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is a central focus, there are queries circulating as to 





Though Senegal is experiencing more economic and political stability now, these factors 
still affect the work of the group, whether because of staff turnover or institutional 
frameworks to sustain partnerships.  In order to keep costs down, there has been no 
renewal in the civil service for many years.  This is creating a huge potential problem 
because of the gap between the senior managers and a very young workforce with nothing 
in between to take over when the senior managers retire in the near future.  
 
The national context translates into a lack of resources, payment scheduling, coordination 
among ministries, and changes at the municipal level, all which affect research being used 
as intended.25  
 
The national urgency of the PRSP sidetracked the originally planned MIMAP work, yet 
because of this involvement MIMAP has clearly led to a much better and thereby a more 
effective PRSP in Senegal.  Diagne notes they continue to work actively with the Ministry 
of Finance of course as well.  They have been approached by the Ministry of Agriculture 
but so far have declined to become actively involved with them because of concern that 
they are moving too far away from the CREA mission in some of the commissioned work 
and do not want to scatter the CREA resources too broadly. 
 
                                                
24 Sall, 2002. 
25 National resources are severely constrained and nearly all programs, whether for public 
health, education, economic development, or other, are inadequately resourced. (Sylla, 
2002). 
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Each of these factors are summarized in the table below, highlighting how similar factors 
can work to enhance policy influence, or distract from it. 
 
Figure 3: Factors Affecting Policy Influence 









MIMAP project leader accepted as 
credible and trustworthy. Considered 
able to communicate with policy 
community. 
 
IDRC project officer permits flexibility in 
programmed activities resulting in 
favourable results. 
 
PRSP process designated to most 
capable person within the Ministry of 













Competent experts compiled data 
nationally resulting in greater ownership 
and improved implementation.  
 
National experts lured to international 
and multilateral agencies may result in 
influence at the international level. 
 
CREA was seen as a competent 
research centre resulting in the team 
being involved in the PRSP process. 
Over-extended capacity of key people 
resulting in them not being available 
when work is needed. 
 
Human capital is short in Senegal, and 
the existing pool is often lured to more 
lucrative, international work. 
 
External offers and staff turnover 
disrupts the project and its timelines. 
 
Suggestions for capacity strategies such 
as external training or foreign lead 
researchers may result in brain drain or 
the project faltering when the lead 









Policy makers perceive themselves as 
both researchers and bureaucrats, 
greater possibilities for collaboration 
among these actors.  Researcher’s work 
received positively. 
 
International recognition of the quality of 
the PRSP document results in positive 
local press.  Pride. 
 
Simply working on the PRSP process 
offers access to policy influence 
because of the international recognition. 
 
Researchers are seen as having their 
“heads in the clouds” and as pertaining 










Greater visibility for CREA means more 
credibility and interaction. 
 
The “Day of Reflection on the Economy 
of Senegal” particularly useful format for 
sharing findings. 
 
Policy makers prefer easily digestible 





A national policy window provides 
significant opportunity for involving 
researcher in a collaborative effort. 
 
Academics work on less evident long 
term issues which may become 
important policy issues in future. 
 
Capacity and institution building takes 
time – a valuable resource when 












External stakeholder (CIDA officer) 
plays a role in bringing the research and 
policy communities to work together. 
 
 
Better communications among the 
research and policy communities are 
required for a better understanding of 










 IDRC seed money / institutional support 
helped to develop a strong research 
centre. 
 
Voiced need for an institutional structure 











 The country’s political, legislative, 
economic, technical, social issues 
distract from the efficiency of research 
infiltrating policy arenas. 
 
Few well trained people being over-
extended and in demand from external 








MIMAP Senegal started in June 2000 so its trajectory is short compared to that of the 
Philippines and Bangladesh, the two other MIMAP cases reviewed by IDRC’s bridging 
research and policy initiative.  Policy influence may seem difficult in such a short time 
period,  but that the program became linked to a specific policy process right away set a 
very favourable environment for the work to be translated into concrete policies.  
 
That the PRSP was not part of MIMAP’s original landscape is a very striking aspects of 
this study.  A number of internal and external factors created a significant policy window 
which was critical in joining these two efforts, and making the result so successful. 
Certainly some researchers and some departments are more open to collaboration than 
others, but the partnership developed was particularly interactive.  This is in stark contrast 
 16
to other research projects that are particularly dependent on dissemination to reach policy 
makers and adequately inform them of findings.  In this case, an inverse relationship is 
seen in that the more research is invited into the process, the less dissemination is a 
critical factor.  Dissemination as a concept has a passive connotation that is contrasted 
with how mainstream MIMAP Senegal became.  Policy makers became a standing 
constituency of MIMAP as MIMAP unfolded into the PRSP.  Since, the PRSP is serving as 
a catalyst to improved teamwork and coordination between stakeholders and contributors, 
and bridging the gap between data, research and decision making.  
 
There was little, if any, competition from other national research centers that could meet 
the demand at hand.  Had the PRSP been given to another entity or persons that were 
perhaps less capable of making it a success, the lesson that seems to have been learned 
may not have occurred.  As it happens, policy makers are aware of the success, and new 
processes for policymaking are in the making with hopeful signs of long-term impact on 
decision making. 
 
CREA and MIMAP are used interchangeably throughout the paper which reflects the very 
close ties. Similar reference was made indicating government officials feel that the PRSP 
for them, is MIMAP.  The project provided financial flexibility to develop capacity to be 
used where the need was highest.  This has created a supply and demand relationship 
where government demands for CREA/MIMAP cannot be sufficiently met because of 
limited supply. 
 
Regardless of whether IDRC funded the specific research that led to the final result or if 
previous support coupled with the flexibility in regards to the opportunity to work on the 
PRSP instead of  planned MIMAP outputs, the institutional support contributed to what 
appears to be an ideal environment for the final result – an internationally recognized 







Resources include various internal and public IDRC documents on MIMAP Senegal. The 
public documents are available at www.idrc.ca.  
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